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in Burma/Myanmar 
Abstract: Burma/Myanmar seems to be a perfect ground for transitional justice with both 
long-failed transitions to democracy that seemed to succeed in 2015 finally and smouldering 
civil war taking place there since 1948 (since the 1990s limited to Borderlands). Unfortu-
nately, the political realities in Burma/Myanmar make it unlikely, if not impossible, for tran-
sitional justice to be applicable in Burma/Myanmar. The victorious in 2015 elections demo-
cratic opposition party, National League for Democracy (NLD) came to power thanks to the 
political deal with the former military government and is consequently being forced to co-
habitate politically with the army that still holds critical political checks over the government. 
It made NLD’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi to conduct moderate domestic policy without trying 
to charge the generals for their former crimes. In this circumstances, transitional justice is 
unwanted by mainstream political actors (NLD, the army) and seen as threatening to peace 
by many in the Myanmar society. This approach firmly places Burma/Myanmar on one side of 
the ‘peace vs justice’ dilemma. It answers the “torturer problem”, one of the central problems of 
transitional justice – how to deal with members of the previous regime which violated human 
rights – in ‘old fashion’ way, by granting them full amnesty. As such Burma/Myanmar case also 
falsifies an optimistic claim that transitional justice is necessary for political reforms. 
Keywords: Burma; Myanmar; transitional justice; transitional justice in Burma/
Myanmar; Aung San Suu Kyi; torturer’s problem
Introduction
Burma/Myanmar has been a marginal case study in transitional justice literature until 
20111. Due to the unlikeness of political change scholars consoled themselves with wishful 
thinking (“while it is unclear when Burma will be free, it is certain that it will eventually 
1  Among exceptions, see: David & Holliday, 2006.
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become a democracy”, Sarkin, 2000) and/or considered hypothetical scenarios in the fu-
ture (David & Holliday, 2006). It happened so because for two decades Burma/Myanmar’s 
development had been blocked by a political stalemate between ruling military regime 
and popular democratic opposition that finally ended with remarkable transformation in 
2011-2015. Ruling military junta introduced political and economic reforms in 2011 that 
resulted in the electoral victory of democratic opposition of National League for Democracy 
(NLD) under Aung San Suu Kyi in 2015. Myanmar’s transformation has led to an increased 
attention from transitional justice scholars (see e.g. David & Holliday, 2012, pp. 121–138; 
Dukalskis, 2015, pp. 83–97; Dukalskis, 2017, pp. 150–151; Tan, 2011), yet the prospects of 
achieving (some sort of) transitional justice in Burma/Myanmar are today as remote as they 
had been before 2011. The victorious NLD is still being forced to cohabitate politically with 
the army (Tatmadaw) that still holds key political checks over the government. This forces 
Suu Kyi – a rational political actor – to maintain non-confrontational policy towards the 
Tatmadaw where charging generals for their former crimes is politically out of the question: 
it would undermine – or even topple – the NLD’s government. Thus, from transitional justice 
Burma/Myanmar represents an interesting case in the “peace vs justice” dilemma politically 
firmly settled in favour of the former. 
Transitional Justice, Torture Problem and the Peace vs the Justice 
Dilemma
Transitional justice is a concept in transitional studies and human rights studies that “refers 
to the ways countries emerging from periods of conflict and repression address large scale 
or systematic human rights violations so numerous and so serious that the normal justice 
system will not be able to provide an adequate response” (ICTJ, 2017a). This concept are 
linked with a country’s transition from totalitarianism/authoritarianism to more demo-
cratic systems and/or from conflict to peace and reconciliation. There is no single defini-
tion of transitional justice: the available ones can be classified as ‘narrow’ ones (that focus 
on legal aspects: (re)establishing the rule of law through legal mechanisms prosecutions) 
and ‘broader’ ones (which include also post-conflict practices such as peacebuilding and 
pay more attention to culture aspects, Nagy, 2008, p. 277–278; Teitel, 2000; Mani, 2002, p. 
17; Roht-Arriaza, 2006, p. 2). United Nation takes the broader approach where transitional 
justice is “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt 
to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, to ensure accountability, serve 
justice and achieve reconciliation” (UNRIC, 2010). 
According to latest UNGA document, these activities include: “the promotion of healing 
and reconciliation, a professional, accountable and effective security sector, including through 
its reform, and inclusive and effective demobilization, disarmament and reintegration 
programmes, including the transition from demobilization and disarmament to reintegra-
tion, are critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, 
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the rule of law, access to justice and good governance, further extending legitimate State 
authority and preventing countries from lapsing or relapsing into conflict (UNGA, 2016). The 
International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), defines the major issues of transitional 
justice as following: criminal justice, reparations, truth and memory, institutional reform, 
gender justice and children and youth (ICTJ, 2017b). Despite these broad views, however, 
a predominance for the legalist paradigm in the transitional justice literature which arises 
from (Western) perception of law as neutral and universal way of international interaction 
is still perceivable (Oomen, 2006, p. 893; on the other hand it is fair to admit that recent 
scholarship has limited this legalistic bias, see among others: Verdeja, 2009; Millar, 2011). Due 
to this legalistic predominance in IT literature, transitional justice tends to focus on violation 
of human rights and/or on criminal acts and often leaves aside such issues as structural 
violence and social injustice (Nagy 2008, p. 284) and often implicitly “assumes that a legal 
response should be the primary measure by which progress toward rebuilding societies torn 
apart by communal violence should be judged”, Fletcher et al., 2009, p. 166). 
The core of transitional justice is the very notion of justice. Initially, in the 1940s, 
transitional justice originated from need for ‘justice’ as a normative expectation (“when 
a wrong is committed, justice has to be done or at least must be seen to be done”), derived 
from Western moral and legal tradition lex talionis (‘an eye for an eye’, in today’s language: 
retributive justice (Suren, 2009, p. 348). Since then has, however, developed (particularly 
in late 1980s and 1990s) in multiply dimensions (the institutions of international criminal 
tribunals, the emergence of a “right to truth” and “right to reparation” under international 
law, transnational proliferation of truth and reconciliation commissions as well as the 
expansion of transitional justice scholarship and the birth of international and regional 
transitional justice NGOs., Nagy, 2008, p. 274) and transformed into “a form of justice that 
seeks to be a response to a wrong while at the same time seeking to be a form of justice 
which avoids the legal absolutism of retributive justice” (Suren, 2009, p. 349). Nevertheless, 
transitional justice is still often perceived (at least in Southeast Asia) as an imported concept 
from different cultural traditions (David & Holliday, 2006, p. 102). This is due to the fact 
that transitional justice is “steeped in Western liberalism, and often located outside the area 
where conflict occurred […] almost always in non-Western, developing countries”, hence 
“may be alien and distant to those who actually have to live together after atrocity” and is 
being prone to accusations of Western universalism (Nagy, 2008, p. 275–281). It can also 
be blamed for being “ahistorical or decontextualised” (Fletcher et al., 2009, p. 208). Finally, 
it may be, too, considered as an “a discourse and practice imbued with power” (Nagy, 2008, 
p. 286). Although recent scholarship on transitional justice showed that this is not entirely 
the case (Verdeja, 2009; Millar, 2011), this critical understanding of transitional justice still 
holds true, at least in Southeast Asia. 
In its assumptions, transitional justice seeks to find national strategies to confront with 
difficult past which can help to achieve accountability and restore harmony in the state-
to-citizen relationship. Transitional justice has been used as a hope to “overcome historical 
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divisions, achieve justice, and build a more inclusive society based on reconciliation and 
trust.” (Prospects…, 2015), and “become central to the efforts of those who prioritise the 
need to end conflicts and wars because it allows for the consideration of instruments that si-
multaneously take note of wrongs committed and are amenable to ‘principled compromises’” 
(Suren 2009, p. 350). Hence, transitional justice became an “umbrella term” that analysis how 
to deal with an abusive former official, with roughly two main policies: to punish them or 
to pardon them (Holliday, 2011, p. 96; Holliday, 2014, p. 192). 
Transitional justice measures to deal with the past include prosecution, compensation, 
and truth-telling, establishing accountable institutions and the rule of law, making access 
to justice a reality for the most vulnerable in society, advancing the cause of reconciliation 
and others. According to broader views, it encompasses four main approaches: criminal 
prosecutions for at least the most responsible for the most serious crimes, “truth-seeking” 
(or fact-finding) processes into human rights violations by non-judicial bodies (commis-
sions), reparations for human rights violations taking a variety of forms, reform of laws and 
institutions including the police, judiciary, military and military intelligence (ICTJ, 2017a). 
Others narrow the most important institutions of transitional justice to two only: truth and 
reconciliation commission and lustration system (Holliday, 2011, p. 97–98). Finally, the insti-
tution of transitional justice can be divided into retributive (accountability for mass abuses, 
such as international courts) and restorative justice mechanisms (that rehabilitate victims 
of human rights abuses and reintegrate them back into their communities, such as truth 
commissions (ICTJ, 2017a). Examples of transitional justice include Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, Africa and – most importantly here because of the regional context – Cambodia 
and East Timor (for a detailed study of these two Southeast Asian countries’ transitional 
justice, see: Fletcher et al., 2009)
One of the themes within transitional justice that apply to Burma/Myanmar is the 
so-called “torturer problem”, present in the democratisation literature of the “third way 
of democratisation” and of the transitions of the 1990s (David & Holliday, 2006, Herz, 
1982; Huntington, 1991). It focuses “on how to deal with massive human rights violations, 
killings, extrajudicial punishments, torture, corruption and fraud committed by, for or at 
the behest of a departing, or departed, regime” and differentiate the following policy op-
tion: “from impunity to sanctions, from pardon and forget to prosecute and punish” with 
initially two major ones: amnesty and prosecution; these two (thanks to the birth of truth 
and reconciliation commissions and by the development of lustration systems) were later 
complemented by reconciliation and lustration (David & Holliday, 2006, p. 93–94). Hence, the 
torturer problem may be resolved either by amnesty or prosecution or by hybrid scenarios 
(reconciliations/lustrations strategies). 
Another important issue within transitional justice that applies to Burma/Myanmar 
case is the so-called justice versus peace dilemma that arises following conflicts or after 
the transition from authoritarianism to more democratic systems. On one side there are 
victims of the warfare or those repressed by the old regime (and their families), local and 
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international NGOs, some international institutions and engaged individuals: they all 
demand “justice”, that is some “form of accountability be imposed on the perpetrators of 
gross human rights violations and war crimes”, citing accountability for the sake of victims, 
their survivors, society at large, deterrence and the (re)building of democracy and the rule 
of law (Sriram 2009, p. 1–2). On the other side are those who advocate peacebuilding/ 
peace-making in order not to make the conflict re-emerge or the transition to democracy 
reverse; they do not question the value of justice or accountability, but warn that enforcing 
it may destabilise fragile post-conflict or under-transition states. Fletcher and others (2009, 
p. 219) after having examined seven international countries that experienced transitional 
justice (including two Southeast Asian –Cambodia and East Timor), wrote that “we cannot 
assume that peace equals democracy […] the international emphasis on avoiding impunity 
as the highest priority may be ill-advised. If we can accept the possibility that retributive 
justice may be delivered at a later time, justice delayed is not justice denied”. 
Although each country is unique and usually the dichotomy justice vs. peace is muted 
by a mixture of both positions (in “transitology” literature many claim that there exist 
“a consensus that moved past the initial debates of ‘peace versus justice’ there can be no 
lasting peace without some accounting”, Nagy, 2008, p. 276), the Burma/Myanmar example 
provides a good example that the opposite is true: the dichotomy is still well and alive. 
Burma/Myanmar presents itself as “old-fashion” example of “peace”-oriented strategies (in 
Galtung’s “negative peace” understanding: negative because something undesirable, such 
as violence, stopped happening; contrary to “positive peace”, which means restoration of 
relationships, the creation of social systems that serve the needs of the whole population 
and the constructive resolution of conflict, Galtung, 1996). In Burma/Myanmar justice is 
still being considered as threatening to peace and unwanted by mainstream political actors 
and by many in the society. 
The Settings: Burma/Myanmar’s Political Circumstances until 2015
Burma/Myanmar seems to be a perfect ground for transitional justice as has been a play-
ground for civil war since 1948 (in last three decades limited to Borderlands) and long-failed 
transition to democracy that seemed to finally succeed in 2015. Unfortunately, the political 
realities in Burma/Myanmar make it unlikely, if not impossible, for transitional justice to 
become applicable on the ground. 
Burma/Myanmar, along with the closed and isolated country, hit the world’s headlines 
in 1988 when mass protests toppled (temporarily) the military government, responsible for 
Burma’s economic plight. Once the Burmese army (Tatmadaw) regained its position after 
September 18, 1988, it bided farewell to socialist (non)development and embarked on (wild) 
capitalism which perpetuated the systemic poverty of the majority of the society and led to 
and the emergence of “crony capitalism”. The terms depict a group of several families that 
grew rich with the help military regime (they relied on favours from the army-controlled 
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state; the system reserved lucrative contracts for favoured businessmen) and dominated the 
economy (Szep & Marshall, 2012). While Myanmar was getting poorer, the “crony capitalists” 
were getting more prosperous and Western sanctions did not stop them from becoming the 
new commercial elite. 
From the perspective of transitional justice, however, it was not Tatmadaw ineffective 
governance and mismanagement in the economic sphere that matters, but Burmese army’s 
extraordinary brutality. The long list of gross abuses of human rights in Burma/Myanmar 
include, among others: legacy of mass atrocities against ethnic minorities, arbitrary ar-
rest and detention, extrajudicial execution, torture, forced labour and forced relocations, 
human trafficking, and sexual violence against women (mass rapes, forced prostitution), 
institutionalized attacks on religious, educational, art, charity buildings (such as hospitals), 
forced use of civil porters by the army (see: UN 1989–2017 reports, e.g. Situation…, 2011). 
The enormous brutality of Tatmadaw has forced the people of Burma to “live in silence” 
(Fink, 2009) and evoked international calls – originating even from UN Envoys to Burma/
Myanmar – for inquiry committee or even war crimes tribunal-like mechanisms against 
Burmese junta (Quintana, 2010, p. 29). 
Gross violating of human rights was one of the reasons why the West has introduced 
sanction against Burma/Myanmar (since 1997, extended in 2004 and 2008). Although there 
has been a living debate about the impact on sanctions (with both sides having honest argu-
ments), generally it must be admitted that the sanctions failed to produce anticipated results 
(Burma/Myanmar’s transition to democracy) due to non-participation of Asian neighbours 
in the sanctions scheme and the xenophobic nature of Burmese regime (Thant Myint-U, 2007, 
p. 342–346, Holliday, 2005). In a way the sanctions even prolonged the political deadlock in 
Myanmar – stalemate between the ruling army and democratic opposition under Suu Kyi 
supported by the West – as it empowered politically Suu Kyi and allowed her to withstand the 
might of the generals for two decades (Lubina, 2016, p. 135–142, Lubina, 2017, p. 44-45). With 
new international circumstances (US pivot to Asia and Burmese generals pivot to the USA) 
that resulted in Naypyidaw-Washington rapprochement, however, the regime introduced 
reforms and sanctions were no longer needed. (Egreteau & Jagan, 2013, p. 432-50). 
In 2011 Senior General Than Shwe, Burma/Myanmar’s dictator from 1992 (officially) 
retired while his nominee, gen. Thein Sein, representative of the progressive fraction within 
military-dominated Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), became president and 
embarked on a series of political reforms. These were “top-to-bottom”, elite-driven reforms: 
initiation of a political dialogue with the opposition, the release of political prisoners, 
liberalisation of media (lifting of censorship, unblocking Internet). Internationally, Myanmar 
re-gained acknowledgement the on the international scene, with Western sanctions being 
lifted in 2012 and many grants and loans offered afterwards (Bünte & Portela, 2012; Lubina, 
2013, p. 443–458).
Crucial to the reforms was Aung San Suu Kyi’s behaviour. Having struggled twenty 
years in vain with the army, Suu Kyi “saw the writing on the wall” and yielded. She accepted 
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the political reality of Tatmadaw’s political dominance and decided to manoeuvre herself 
a leading position within the Army-constructed system (until 2011 she tried in vain to 
overthrow the military-dominated system). She made many political compromises, such 
as accepting donations from army cronies, declaring love for Tatmadaw, participating in 
army’s parades, not backing the peasants in their struggle with Chinese-controlled company 
over their lands and – most importantly for the West – silencing over Rohingya’s plight 
(Lubina, 2016, pp. 137–145). The essence of Suu Kyi-Tatmadaw’s unwritten agreement has 
been “inclusion, consensus and stability” (Holliday, 2014). 
NLD’s conciliatory position after 2011 led to the strengthening of the position of the 
cronies. They repositioned themselves as ‘new faces of Myanmar Inc” and spawned a sec-
ond generation elite, a class of entrenched business dynasties; this all made Myanmar 
transformation being carved up between the generals, cronies, some NLD members and 
emerging-markets investors (Szep & Marshall, 2012). Structurally, it meant “entrenched 
political role for the military in nominally democratic institutions” (David & Holliday, 2006, 
p. 91). Despite significant political rapprochement with the generals after 2011, Suu Kyi was 
unable to convince them to change the constitution that guarantee military dominance (three 
ministries: defence, home affairs and border affairs; budget autonomy and legal option of 
staging a coup, and 25 percent of the seats in the parliament for the army) and blocks Suu 
Kyi from becoming president (Constitution, 2008). Suu Kyi, however, did not give in. She 
bet all her cards on the parliamentary elections of November 2015 and won (these elections 
were “to-be-or-not-to-be” for her: if she would not win it decisively, she could not have to 
say farewell to her political career). This election, however crucial and necessary for Suu 
Kyi, were just the beginning of the real negotiations for power. 
From the perspective of transitional justice, the fact that it was the military government 
(not Democrats from the opposition) that planned and implemented the reforms, was crucial. 
Tatmadaw prepared itself carefully not to be charged by former atrocities. The army from 
the beginning hoped that there would be no questions of transitional justice: “if the country 
really does have to embrace democracy without adjectives, then let it come in a gradualist 
way that never creates an opening for analysis of past injustice” (Holliday, 2011, p. 96). Just in 
case, the military-based authors of the 2008 Myanmar’s Constitution have written impunity 
clause into it. The Article 445 prevents any legal possibility for judging Tatmadaw’s past 
atrocities by stating: ‘no proceeding shall be instituted against the said Councils (former 
junta’s Councils) or any member thereof or any member of the government, in respect of 
any act done in the execution of their respective duties.’(Constitution, 2008). The fact that 
“the current constitution is inconsistent with international human rights law, which deems 
amnesties for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes unacceptable” (Impunity 
Watch, 2014) does not bother the generals. The Burmese military leaders are brought up 
in a political culture that places non-interference and domestic affairs above any universal 
rights (and the generals are politically too strong to accept any international legal supervision 
over Burma/Myanmar). 
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Tatmadaw’s stance (predictably) has not changed after political reforms started. The 
military has released most of the political prisoners (though not all) but has done little 
in the way of reparations for them. Despite setting up Myanmar National Human Rights 
Commission (MNHRC) by Thein Sein government in 2011 (despite opposition from part of 
the military: the parliament, or Hluttaw, declared this decree to be unconstitutional which 
showed opposition to Thein Sein’s reforms within the army, Holliday, 2014, p. 195), when 
several cases of rights abuses were filed to the Commission (as well as to Supreme Court), 
these were rejected (cases of Kachin woman Samlut Roi Ja abducted by Tatmadaw in 2011 
and another one of Ja Seng Ing probably killed by Burmese armed forces, FIDH 2014, Who 
killed… 2014; Impunity Watch, 2014). The latter case turned out to be symptomatic: “com-
plainant was successfully sued by the military for defamation and fined”, which “continues 
to exert a chilling effect” on any other attempts to make Tatmadaw accountable for past 
crimes (Thomson, 2016). 
Military’s unwillingness to accept its past misdeeds remains the most important obstacle 
for transitional justice to take roots in Burma/Myanmar. It is complemented by other, 
structural reasons. The fundamental one is poverty: despite recent impressive economic 
development Burma/Myanmar remains a very developing country, and people are more 
engaged in improving their lives. In such environment transitional justice “is often seen 
as a luxury that can only be afforded once other developmental challenges are solved 
(…) large parts of the population tend to focus on ‘moving on’, addressing daily economic 
needs, and seeing questions of justice as jeopardising their efforts in achieving social and 
economic stability” (Impunity Watch, 2014). That is why Burmese conditions (so far) falsify 
the claim that the “popular dissatisfaction” is an argument against applying amnesty in 
transitional justice (David & Holliday, 2006, p. 95).The argument about popular resentment 
over amnesty is generally right per se, but not so in local, Burmese conditions where above 
mentioned “move on” attitude and cultural fatalism (Spiro 1982, p. 439; Burmese society is 
accustomed to injustice of their rulers – probably none of the Burmese kings deserved the 
title Dhammaraja – and certainly none of the military leaders they were rather considered 
traditionally as one of the “five enemies” of the people) made amnesty a possible option. 
Naturally, one may argue that this attitude of not favouring the pursuit of transitional 
justice originates from the fear that “oppressive forces will once again rise and assume 
power” (Sarkin, 2000), but in the end, regardless of motivations, the result is the same: the 
society is rather skeptical about transitional justice. If transitional justice most important 
questions – that is “what is most beneficial to the people whose lives have been disrupted or 
even destroyed by the perpetrators of violence?” and “what the affected society wants in the 
immediate aftermath and how can the response be tailored to the particular cultural, social 
and economic context? ” (Fletcher et al., 2009, p. 165) – is often being answered in Burma/
Myanmar as “forget and move on”, then it must be taken into consideration. Otherwise, 
transitional justice may be considered ideological and “may become suffused with accusa-
tions that international-sponsored “justice” is (yet) another instance of foreign or Western 
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imposition” (Fletcher et al., 2009, p. 212). Naturally, Burmese social fatalism belongs to the 
category of “cultural” arguments prone to criticism (“what cannot be explained in terms of 
rationality or logic is expelled into the realm of culture”, Philpott, 2000, p. 79) and/or can 
be counter by claims of “country’s dominant Buddhist culture of compassion, forbearance 
and unconditional forgiveness” that is consistent with transitional justice (Holliday, 2011, p. 
101). Nevertheless one should not dismiss cultural arguments out-of-hand: in transitional 
justice literature it is admitted that “culture and traditions shaped the response of a country 
to its past period of repression or mass violence” and that there is “a dynamic relationship 
among the racial, ethnic, and religious identity of those persecuted, their political power, and 
the social values to which political leaders could appeal in crafting the state’s response to 
the violence […] context matters, and it matters considerably” (Fletcher et al., 2009, p. 207). 
Hence, in Burma/Myanmar culture (or, to be exact, traditional fatalism of the significant 
part of the society) plays a role in obstructing transitional justice. This is a minor one only. 
The most important obstacle remains political: it is the nature of Burmese transition which 
produces lack of political will towards transitional justice. 
The Post-2015 Burma/Myanmar’s Transformation Founding Deal 
Despite being a milestone and necessary step in NLD’s ascendance to power, the 2015 elec-
tions were politically not the turning point in Burma/Myanmar’s transition: this title goes 
to the deal that was struck afterwards behind closed doors between the military and Aung 
San Suu Kyi. The nature of this deal and the political reality that followed make it highly un-
likely for transitional justice to become an attractive option for Burmese political elites. 
In November-December 2015 the real political power was negotiated between Suu Kyi 
and the military regime. Having lost the elections army-backed party, USDP was shocked by 
its dramatic defeat in the polls. The generals had hoped for a divided parliament, in which 
no party has a majority, but NLD’s score (77%) ruined these calculations. It was not only 
well ahead of minimum 67% percent needed by this party to rule alone but also showed 
the unchanged extent of popular support for Suu Kyi (in 1990 she achieved 80%) and 
gave her a strong, popular (and international) mandate. Despite all that, politically it was 
the army which enjoyed better negotiation position by the privilege of being structurally 
advantaged by the constitution which forces every government to cooperate, cohabitate, if 
not co-rule, with the army. Suu Kyi, having remembered the year 1990 when the generals 
nullified victorious for NLD elections, knew that only a deal with the generals guarantees 
the handover of power (the danger that the army may not accept the results of the elections 
again was real). Being in weaker political position, she needed to persuade the army to give 
back the power. 
What is crucial here, from transition justice, Suu Kyi politically couldn’t do what many in 
Myanmar hoped for: make a political reckoning with the past. For many people in Burma/
Myanmar, a payback (making army accountable for past crimes and misdeeds) seemed the 
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proper action logically. For too many, the “blank slate” amnesty tactics went against the very 
notion of political justice. Unfortunately, what may seem right in the Weberian “ethnics of 
convictions” is not quite so in the “ethics of responsibility” (Weber, 1919/1946). Amnesty 
is “is often distasteful and unjust. It may inflict deep pain and suffer on victims and their 
families and friends. It may be difficult for opposition leaders to defend. At the same time, 
it may offer the only realistic way forward if violence and human rights violations are to 
cease” (David & Holliday, 2006, p. 93). 
The same can be said about dealings with cronies, despicable by the majority of the 
society. Contrary to social expectations and contrary to the logic of “ethnics of convictions”, 
Suu Kyi couldn’t allow herself to being tempted by a political payoff; this would ruin her 
chances of persuading the army to accept her electoral victory, and perhaps even sabotage 
reforms and inflict repressions (and consequently ruin the achievements of last few years). 
Thus, after the elections, Suu Kyi presented a politically wise, conciliatory tone: she called for 
a dialogue, national reconciliation and did not criticise military-backing cronies (she already 
befriended some of them earlier). It opened her doors for negotiation power transition. 
A series of Suu Kyi’s behind-the-scenes talks with military leaders (gen Min Aung Hlaing, 
the commander-in-chief of the army and gen. Than Shwe, former dictator), former Suu Kyi’s 
political opponents, if not enemies, took place in November and December 2015 (Aung Zaw, 
2016a). The negotiations remained secret: no media was present, and no communiqués were 
published, and the details (where, where, who, how many meetings, what was discussed and 
what was agreed) are still unknown. This low profile style was done in purpose as this local 
equivalent of “cabinet diplomacy”, brokered behind closed doors was entirely consistent 
with Burmese political culture: this is the dominant pattern of making politics, followed 
for example by Suu Kyi’s father Aung San in Panglong in 1947. 
Although the results are unknown, one may judge by what happened next. Suu Kyi and 
the generals must have agreed on basic principles of cooperation and kept the deal despite 
Suu Kyi’s attempt (in late January/early February 2016) to become the president (Suu Kyi’s 
political charge in late January 2016 made commentators hold their breath; later, however, 
it turned out that it was a “smoke screen” – while generals and commentators were busy 
trying to figure out Suu Kyi’s intentions, she nominated her loyal subordinate, Htin Kyaw 
for presidency and established the unique position of “state counsellor” for herself that 
gives her control over government). Suu Kyi’s relations with the army have remained good. 
NLD’s government has not tried to undermine the privileged position of armed forces, does 
not interfere in army’s clashes with ethnic minorities’ Northern Alliance, is indifferent to 
Rohingya’s plight, maintains cordial relations with crony capitalists and continues Myanmar’s 
traditional balancing foreign policy. In fact, Suu Kyi’s government is continuing rather than 
reversing former military’s policies (even the 21st Century Panglong Conference may be 
seen as the continuation of the National Ceasefire formula). It is unsurprising given the 
fact that political circumstances on the ground (2008 Constitution, the political might of 
the Tatmadaw) force NLD to cohabit with the army. Suu Kyi has accepted this reality and 
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has not challenged the army directly, at least not yet. Thanks to that, as some Burmese 
commentators say, Suu Kyi has been accepted by army’s elite as Myanmar’s political leader 
(Aung Zaw, 2016b). 
Hence, on the systemic level, Suu Kyi’s ascendance to power was possible thanks to the 
political deal with the army. Suu Kyi achieved Tatmadaw’s consent in return for guaranteeing 
generals political security and dominance in the economic sphere. The army on its turn 
showed restraint by accepting the end of its full control over the state and the economy. 
Politically speaking, this “rotten compromise” was probably the best option for Myanmar. 
Given Tatmadaw’s scale of military economic and social mismanagement in last five decades, 
army’s poor human rights record (mass repressions), their corporate interests, their political 
might, any attempt to reckon with Tatmadaw could prompt resumption of repressions, 
withholding the reforms or even a new coup d’état. That is why Suu Kyi by guaranteeing 
military safe landing secured the results of her electoral victory and made it possible for her 
country to continue its reforms and modernisation. Judging by political perspective, tabula 
rasa tactics towards the army remains the best policy choice available on the ground.
About transitional justice literature, Burma/Myanmar’s founding deal follows the ex-
amples of other transitional countries, such as South Africa: “at the heart of the deals that 
have underpinned negotiated and nuanced transitions to democracy has usually been some 
form of impunity. It can take many guises, such as immunity from prosecution, selective 
prosecution and a statute of limitations” (David & Holliday, 2006, p. 92–93). However, the 
Burma/Myanmar case differs in one thing: the nature of the amnesty granted to the regime. 
When David and Holliday (David & Holliday, 2006, p. 92–93) offered a transitional model 
for Burma/Myanmar in the 2000s they rightly portrayed the necessary steps to be taken by 
the opposition (Suu Kyi). According to them, in order to prompt key members of the regime 
to sit down around the table, convince them to relinquish their power and avoid attempts 
of avenging justice afterwards, the opposition (here: Suu Kyi) needed to provide them with 
incentives and credible assurances of immunity from punishment, otherwise they wouldn’t 
negotiate about real political reform: “it is necessary to set the junta free if Myanmar is to 
be coaxed along the road to democracy. By this, we mean two main things. First, the junta 
needs to be given an opportunity to release itself from the entrenched position it has taken 
over many years […] Second, individual members of the regime need to be offered personal 
incentives to cooperate with a process of democratic change.” This Suu Kyi has done. However, 
at the same time David and Holliday were wrong when they proposed qualified amnesty as 
the model for Burma/Myanmar (“qualified amnesty in exchange for truth”) and stated that 
this amnesty “is necessary for political reform” (2006, p. 91-92). As 2015/2016 developments 
have showed, it turned out that qualified amnesty was not necessary at all. The model of 
qualified amnesty was based on the inexplicit conviction that it would be an opposition 
that will dictate the rules of transition, or simply be in stronger political position. Perhaps 
Suu Kyi herself, given a chance, would prefer the South African-based model of qualified 
amnesty (at least her interviews from 1990s where she frequently evoked South African 
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example might suggest that, Aung San Suu Kyi, Alan Clements, 1997/2008, p. 38, 218–219, 
180; apparently she advocated a local version of “merciful justice”, Holliday, 2014, p. 189), but 
it was not on her to decide. In Burma/Myanmar after 2015, however, the Leninist rule “who 
will beat whom” was settled in favour of the army. Thus, Burma/Myanmar represents rather 
another type from transitional justice literature. It is a classical example of one of three broad 
types of political transition: the reform. In this scenario “old government plays a critical role 
[…] determines the type and pace of change” while “old forces still retain control at some 
level […] since these former leaders retain much power, they have the ability, to a greater 
or lesser extent, to dictate what happens in the transitional process”; and, as a last resort, 
they may stage another coup d’etat if provoked”; that is why in this model “an amnesty is 
likely”(Sarkin, 2000). This is precisely what happened in in Burma/Myanmar. Since change 
happened on generals’ terms they were the ones who decided about the conditions on the 
negotiations table; hence the only available option on the table was the full, unconditional 
amnesty (“blanket amnesty”). Without it, the generals would not relinquish the power, 
which is, by the way, a classic motivation of authoritarian rulers (Przeworski, 1991). 
Blanket amnesty had traditionally been a favorite way of ending civil war or in a transi-
tion from democracy to authoritarianism. However, since the 1990s and 2000s, the transi-
tional domestic justice in South Africa, the development of international tribunal courts 
(former Yugoslavia, Rwanda) and even the hybrid courts (Cambodia) blanket amnesty 
was losing favour (Dugard, 1999). Reasons cited for this were: inability to deliver fresh 
start, impossibility to demonstrate political change and unfeasibility with the international 
criminal law; that is why in the 2000s “blanket amnesty as a measure of transitional justice 
was almost completely off the agenda” (David & Holliday, 2006, p. 95). There emerged “an 
international consensus that atrocity crimes should not go unpunished. As a corollary, 
blanket amnesties are rejected as a necessary compromise to purchase peace” (Fletcher et 
al., 2009, p. 215). Burma/Myanmar case, however, suggests that perhaps in the circumstances 
of resurging worldwide authoritarianism of the 2010s this compromise is no longer valid; 
a blanket amnesty is perhaps again an attractive option for the transition. Out of three 
conditions apparently required for an amnesty to achieve success in the transitional country: 
suitability, discontinuity and feasibility (Przeworski, 1991, David & Holliday, 2006, p. 95) 
Burma/Myanmar’s blanket amnesty case fulfils suitability and feasibility but not discontinu-
ity. A discontinuity, however, did not prove to be necessary for transforming Myanmar, at 
least so far. 
This political reality of blanket amnesty has, however, produced a highly negative con-
sequences for transitional justice to occur in Burma/Myanmar. Most of Burma/Myanmar’s 
today’s challenges to transitional justice (ongoing armed conflict between parties with 
different historical identities on the peripheries of the state; rising nationalism and Buddhist-
Muslim tensions, presence of perpetrators of past human rights abuses in government; 
widespread corruption and cronyism; and continuing abuses and arbitrary detentions by 
security forces) originate from the nature of Burmese transition; and thus make “any attempt 
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to pursue comprehensive justice a tightrope walk” ICTJ; as Holliday (2014, p. 183) wrote: 
“transitional justice may take years to gain a secure foothold in Myanmar”; in the Myanmar 
circumstances he may be considered an optimist, for he can believe that transitional justice 
would one day be possible there. 
Burma/Myanmar: Not a Ground for Transitional Justice? 
The post-2015 political landscape in Burma/Myanmar has created circumstances where 
transitional justice is neither wanted by the majority of political actors nor possible in pre-
dictable future. There are several important political reasons behind this agenda, most of 
which can be classified as a “peace” argumentation within the peace vs justice debate. 
First of all, NLD government has “prioritised peace and reconciliation” and focused on 
“reconciliation between leaders of the NLD and the military”; in this approach, reconciliation 
is understood as between the NLD (the former democratic opposition) and the military 
(Thomson, 2016). Suu Kyi herself has repeated her message about “healing past wounds” 
between military and opposition many times (ICG, 2015, p. 5; ThaiBPS 2015; Zarni Mann, 
2015). Moreover, Suu Kyi’s stance on restoring peace in the country (ending the smouldering, 
yet still active conflict on the peripheries) is vague (neither she nor her officials have not 
made any concrete statements) and based on the principle of non-irritating the military 
(“anything that might upset the military is off -limits, in order to secure its full cooperation 
on the NLD’s priority issues”, Thomson, 2016); so far this has not produced breakthrough 
results as Tatmadaw continues its traditional, violent approach to solving ethnic problems 
which backfires Suu Kyi (particularly on the Rohingya issue). Suu Kyi’s flagship project: the 
“new Panglong conference” (historically Third Panglong conference, now called 21st Century 
Panglong Conference) despite bringing most of the ethnic leaders into the negotiation table 
has not produced tangible results yet. Tatmadaw and ethnic military groups (‘old’, such as 
KIA, and ‘new’ such as Northern Alliance) remain non-flexible on their entrenched positions. 
In essence, Suu Kyi’s Panglong scheme does not differ much from military government 
National Cease Fire idea and as such can help in tactical gains but not in long-term resolu-
tion of the ethnic conflict in Burma/Myanmar. In theoretical terms, Suu Kyi’s peace agenda 
belongs to Galtung’s “negative peace” category (Galtung, 1996). 
Second of all, “it appears that the NLD leadership does not believe transitional jus-
tice is necessary or desirable” as it “associate justice or transitional justice with criminal 
prosecutions motivated by revenge” (Thomson, 2016). This understanding of transitional 
justice derives from Suu Kyi’s personal attitude (she has many times stated that he does 
not seek revenge and can work with her former enemies who destroyed her family, placed 
her under house arrest and almost killed her in Depayin in 2003) based on her Buddhist 
convictions (e.g., see: Aung San Suu Kyi, Clements 1997/2008, p. 48, 119–195; Aung San 
Suu Kyi, 1991/2010, p. 170–171). However, leaving speculations about her personal feelings 
aside, her attitude is probably based on political calculations as well. One has to remember 
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that transforming a country and rebuilding the society is “a messy business and rebuilding 
efforts, despite uplifting rhetoric that often inaugurates such initiatives, are no less tidy” 
(Fletcher et al. 2009, p. 169); given this into account, Suu Kyi as a rational actor, has her 
right to prioritise other issues. However, if effective government indeed sustains of “ensuring 
basic security” – both from external enemies as well as internal insurgencies – “meeting the 
basic needs of its citizens” including health and education, and “maintaining legitimacy” 
(Weinstein et al., 2004), then Suu Kyi’s government met only the last condition. 
What must be also said is that the above-mentioned attitude towards transitional justice 
is not confined to Suu Kyi only but it is followed by many, if not most of the Burmese society 
(many Burmese believe that transitional justice is “motivated by revenge or personal gain” 
and express “preference for privately negotiated compromise over public confrontation”, 
Thomson, 2016). Aside from “move on” attitude (in accordance with well-known Maslow’s 
pyramid of needs survival stands well ahead of justice, Holliday, 2014, p. 194), the most 
important factor behind this attitude seems to be the fear: the Burmese are anxious that 
“bringing up the past will provoke a coup by the military” (Pierce 2013, quoted in Holliday, 
2014, p. 193). Furthermore, and this attitude is shared by many Burmese human rights 
defenders and political activists, too; they say “they want nothing for themselves because 
they have chosen to sacrifice for the cause of democracy” and prefer to “focus on pursuing 
justice for those with more immediate needs, like disabled torture victims and families of 
political prisoners who died in prison” and would rather be granted recognition for their 
contributions to the democratization process instead of receiving material reparations 
(Holliday, 2016). 
Third of all, the political reality after 2015 produced a paradox situation where there 
is little room for voices critical of NLD in general and Suu Kyi in particular. Partially it 
has to do with uncomfortable the fact that NLD government has not revoked repressive 
anti-liberal laws (Amnesty International, 2017; sometimes the situation on human rights 
has even worsened, see, e.g. tightened control of social media). So people are afraid to 
speak out against military, and they refrain from reminding Tatmadaw its atrocities. NLD 
government – due to these political reasons (its anxiety over the military’s reaction) is 
even more nervous about any anti-Tatmadaw activities than the previous quasi-civilian 
government composed of former generals. For example in June 2016 NLD government has 
banned launching a report in public in Yangon about Tatmadaw’s atrocities in Northern 
Shan State, whereas “under the previous government, similar report launches were common 
in Yangon, and some ethnic minority activists have taken this and other incidents as a sign 
that their freedom of speech has shrunk since the NLD took power” (Thomson, 2016). 
Fourth and final, many people in Myanmar are reluctant to criticise Suu Kyi’s govern-
ment out of two reasons. The first one is the fear that criticism of NLD might undermine 
the civilian government and implicitly make military rule return possible; the second one 
is anxiety over public ostracism. Suu Kyi as Burma’s “Mother of Nation” is (still) beyond 
public controversy within the majority of Burmese society (though this does not concern 
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ethnic minorities, see below). Finally, the authoritarian policy style of Suu Kyi (visible since 
at least mid-1990s but noticed outside only in 2010s, New York Times, 2015) does not invite 
opinions and dissident voices from outside NLD, so people of Burma understood that their 
opinion is not welcome: “Suu Kyi has made numerous public and private comments on 
the theme that civil society is useless, unnecessary, and selfish” (Thomson, 2016). Suu Kyi’s 
governing style is, by the way, consistent with the traditional way of Burmese policymaking 
since royal times, so for many people, this is somehow natural; they are accustomed to this 
state of affairs. 
The situation with ethnic minorities is a bit different. Ethnic minorities, traditionally 
the biggest victims of Tatmadaw’s atrocities (Smith, 1999), have supported Suu Kyi in 2015 
elections despite the fact that Suu Kyi promised them little beyond platitudes (her stance on 
ethnic minority issues is also quite Burman-centric, Aung San Suu Kyi, 2010, p. 223; Aung San 
Suu Kyi & Clements, 1997/2008, p. 197). Now, many representatives of the ethnic minorities 
feel being used and left by NLD government. Thus, they are more vocal in their criticism 
(which is easily spotted in very popular in Myanmar social media). The ethnic minorities 
“feel particularly exposed; they feel criticism of the conflict will be taken as a criticism of the 
government […] they would be even more vulnerable to arrest, attacks (in person or on social 
media), or being ostracised from mainstream civil society” (Thomson, 2016). Their anxieties 
are justified as in the recent political history of Myanmar it was the ethnic minorities who 
usually paid the highest price for the deterioration of centre (Burman) – periphery (the 
ethnic minorities) relations (Smith, 1999/1991; Lintner 1999).
Finally, there are other, minor reasons why transition justice faces a hard reality check 
in Burma/Myanmar: the existing state institutions (such as MNHRC) are not being seen as 
reliable; there is no witness or victim protection or confidentiality for complainants, and 
overall transparency is non-existent (Thomson, 2016). This is an unsurprising outcome: it 
transitional justice literature it is admitted that when “the judicial system remains marred 
by poorly trained, corrupt, or indifferent judges and staff (then) chronic lack of human 
and physical infrastructure contributes to the inability of these legal systems to administer 
justice”; hence in Burma/Myanmar, as in the examples of Cambodia and East Timor, “weak 
democratic structures and legal institutions pose considerable challenges for transitional 
justice initiatives […] to contribute to long-term societal reconstruction” (Fletcher et al., 
2009, p. 191-209).
Thus, the situation on the ground makes it difficult for transitional justice to take roots 
in a country. This all creates a highly challenging ground for transitional justice to take 
its roots in Burma/Myanmar. Despite that there are some minor, (pre)transitional justice 
initiatives in Burma/Myanmar that need to be listed, such as: cooperation between some 
Members of Parliament, NGOs and community leaders advocating for compensation for 
victims of land evictions, existence of several parliamentary committees for human rights 
violations against ethnic minorities (land confiscations, war crimes), documentation of 
human rights done by such groups as Network for Human Rights Documentation Burma 
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(ND-Burma), Women’s League of Burma (WLB), Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN), 
Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) and others, memorialization efforts by 88 Generation 
Student and Open Society commemorating 1988 student uprising, by e.g. writing letters to 
express their grievances (Impunity Watch, 2014, Levin, 2011, Holliday, 2014, p. 194–195). 
All these memorialization initiatives are important because “in addition to their value as 
mechanisms to provide acknowledgement to survivors of human rights violations and their 
families, memorialisation initiatives can - in the complete absence of formal transitional 
justice mechanisms- contribute to paving the way for further comprehensive justice initia-
tives as opposed to merely complementing them once in place” (Impunity Watch, 2014). 
Nevertheless, despite existing and being autotelically valuable, these initiative are politi-
cally insignificant and socially marginal: they operate in opposition to Burmese political 
mainstream and many, if not to the majority of the society. Given “the continued climate of 
fear and intimidation” or even “a culture of impunity” (Holliday, 2014, p. 198) which creates 
limited space (both institutional and informal) for justice actions, “organisations working 
on transitional justice inside Burma/Myanmar usually operate on a low profile under the 
guise of ‘peacebuilding’, strictly avoiding public reference to sensitive issues such as claims 
for justice and accountability (their) initiatives remain confined to the unofficial, civil 
society level”; hence “the transitional justice process in Burma/Myanmar is in its fledgling 
stages” (Impunity Watch, 2014) and its agency “needs to be handled carefully” (Holliday 
2014, p. 195)
This situation is unlikely to change as long as the political scene in Burma/Myanmar is 
cemented by NLD-Tatmadaw entente based on political convenience. 
Conclusions: Peace, not Justice in Burma/Myanmar
Burma/Myanmar represents an intellectually fascinating case of a country that implemented 
a retro, “old fashion” way to answer the transitional justice’s “torturer problem” (how to deal 
with the atrocities of the former regime members): blanket amnesty. Long considered as 
1) no more acceptable way to deal with former perpetrators and 2) a regress in comparison 
to international developments of the 1990s and 2000s, blanket amnesty today, in the cir-
cumstances of resurging worldwide authoritarianism, re-emerges, perhaps, as an attractive 
option in the transitional period. Indeed it is the chosen option for Burma/Myanmar out 
of social, cultural but mostly political reasons. The nature of Burma/Myanmar’s political 
deal after 2015 and NLD’s choice afterwards produced a political situation where blanket 
amnesty remains the best possible political solution. Aung San Suu Kyi has let the torturers 
go to fulfil her dream of reforming country and fulfilling her ambitions. So far she was right 
to do so. Time will tell, however, whether this Burmese blanket amnesty scenario would be 
able to survive in the long term.
What is certain for now is that all significant political actors in Burma/Myanmar do not 
want transitional justice. The ruling NLD consider it as a threat to peace and transformation. 
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The army rejects it out of hand for obvious reasons. Many people, perhaps the majority, of 
the society are more preoccupied with improving their (dire) economic living conditions 
than with thinking about justice. 
This all makes Burma/Myanmar an interesting local case in the discussion on peace 
vs justice, settled here firmly in favour of the latter. In these circumstances, transitional 
justices face a hard reality check in Burma/Myanmar and remains a future (an uncertain) 
scenario only. 
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